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spring gun or mantrap on property by the owner contemplates the
presence of a trespasser and the intent to injure him. The Supreme
2
I
Court of the United States, in United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt,
held that liability for setting spring guns or traps arises from the fact
that an owner of property has expected the trespasser and has prepared
an injury that is no more justified than if the owner had held a gun and
fired it.
Maryland, 2 6 along with a bare majority of other jurisdictions,2 7
allows the defense of contributory negligence in strict liability actions
based on scienter. Accordingly, in Twigg v. Ryland,2 s judgement in
favor of the dog owner was affirmed where the injured person knew of
the dog's propensities and ". . encouraged the dog to be about her
premises. "29 In Bramble, of course, such a defense would be
inapplicable as the trespassers were not aware of the dog's nature.
The court in Bramble had a dual opportunity to modernize
Maryland's position on a land owner's liability for injury to an
inadvertent trespasser by a dog whose vicious propensities are known to
the owner of the property. The court easily could have used the
analogy of land near a public way, or of a dangerous device of
entrapment. Instead, the Bramble court chose to overlook these sound
positions, as supported by the Restatement of Torts, and rely instead
on a position supported by a seventy-five year-old New York case and
on a common law principle of questionable validity today. The
Maryland court of appeals is regrettably paying homage to the rights of
the long-dead feudal lords of England who were preoccupied with
protecting their manors, in preference to establishing a judicial rule for
D.H. & F.S.L.
the protection of society and human life.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE-AD VALOREM PROPERTY TAXATION
FOR PUBLIC SCHOOLS FINANCING VIOLATES CONSTITUTION.
RODRIGUEZ V. SAN ANTONIO INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971).
In Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School District,' the threejudge District Court in a per curiam opinion ruled that the financing of
2
public education through an ad valorem property tax by that district
25. 258 U.S. 268 (1922).
26. Twigg v. Ryland, 62 Md. 380, 50 Am. R. 226 (1884).
27. See e.g., Melsheimer v. Sullivan, 1 Colo. App. 22, 27 P. 17 (1891); Ryan v. Marren, 216
Mass. 556, 104 N.E. 353 (1914).
28. 62 Md. 380, 50 Am. R. 226 (1884).
29. Id. at 389.
1. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280 (W.D. Tex. 1971);
appeal filed, 40 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. May 16, 1972); prob. juris. noted, 40 U.S.L.W.
3576 (U.S. June 6, 1972); appeal docketed, 41 U.S.L.W. 3041 (U.S. July 11, 1972).
2. Forty-nine of the fifty states use some form of ad valorem property taxation as the means
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violates the fourteenth amendment. An appeal was filed in the United
States Supreme Court on April 17, 1972,' and probable jurisdiction
was noted on June 7, 1972.' A similar result was reached by the
California Supreme Court in Serrano v. Priest,' where the court
local property taxation as a method of
declared unconstitutional
6
financing schools.
The Supreme Court, in Brown v. Board of Education,' first extended
the protection of the fourteenth amendment to elementary and public
schools, 8 and in its ruling against racially segregated schools stated:
...[Elducation is perhaps the most important function of
state and local governments .... Such an opportunity, where
the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be
made available to all on equal terms.9 (Emphasis added).
While Brown deals solely with racial discrimination, the above cited
dictum has opened the door to court scrutiny of any denial of equal
educational opportunity. Rodriguez and Serrano claim that they have
been deprived of their right to equal educational opportunity as
guaranteed by Brown.
It is now fundamental that arbitrary classifications made by the state
are illegal; ° one such classification that has come under increasingly
close scrutiny is "wealth". In striking down the poll tax in Harper v.
Virginia, the Supreme Court said, "Lines drawn on the basis of wealth
or propertv, like those of race ... are traditionally disfavored."' 1 The

3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.

9.

10.
11.

of financing public schools. Hawaii's system of finance is centralized. Annot., -41 A.L.R.
3d 1220, 1228.
40 U.S.L.W. 3551 (U.S. May 16, 1972).
40 U.S.L.W. 3576 (U.S. June 6, 1972). The case was argued before the Supreme Court on
October 12, 1972. As of date of publication, no decision has been reached.
Serrano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), rev'g, 10 Cal.
App. 3d 1110, 89 Cal. Rptr. 345 (Ct. App. 1970). In illustrating the tax disparity, Serrano
introduced the assessed valuations and per pupil expenditures in two areas of Los
Angeles County; Baldwin Park, a poor black area in Los Angeles, spent $577.49 per year
to educate each of its pupils during the 1968-1969 school year, compared to a $1,231.72
expenditure in Beverly Hills. The property valuation per assessed dollar in Baldwin Park
and Beverly Hills was $3,707 and $50,885, respectively.
Id. at 618, 487 P.2d at 1250, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 626.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
The right to a nondiscriminatory education on the graduate level has been recognized
since 1938. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948);
and Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). To further illustrate how the
inequities of the present system affect "education on equal terms", the following example is provided:
School District A, a high land value area, might have land valued on the tax rolls
at a hundred million dollars compared to School District B, a slum area, which
might have land valued at ten million dollars. Thus, to raise a needed five million
dollars for schools, School District A need only a 5% tax rate, compared to a 50%
tax rate that would be required to raise the same sum in School District B.
16 AM. JUR. 2d, ConstitutionalLaw § 469, at 823 (1964).
383 U.S. 663, 668 (1966).
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Rodriguez decision treats the classification of wealth as a criteria for
determining the quality of public education under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The only precedent on the question of local property taxation used
to finance public schools is McInnis v. Shapiro,' 2 which was affirmed
by the Supreme Court without opinion.1 3 The U.S. District Court had
held that it was a constitutional requirement that pupil expenditures be
made only on the basis of "educational needs" of the students. The
financial strength of local school districts was not considered.
McInnis, however, is not on point with Serrano and Rodriguez, as
McInnis' holding was based on the nebulous concept of "educational
needs", while the latter cases held that funding must be equal for all
students within the state. While the concepts of McInnis are not on
point with Rodriguez, the lower court (Court of Appeals) in Serrano
found McInnis as binding precedent.' " McInnis, therefore, may still be
a major stumbling block for the court. The California Law Review
described the court's affirmation of the dismissal in McInnis as follows:
Probably but a temporary setback, it was the predictable
consequence of an effort to force the court to precipitous and
decisive action upon a novel and complex issue for which
neither it nor the parties were ready.' s
Rodriguez must overcome three other major obstacles if it is to be
affirmed. The Supreme Court has yet to rule that de facto segregation
(of wealth) in the schools is in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
If consideration beyond the echo of McInnis is to be given, the
plaintiffs have the task of convincing the court that the segregation
arising from property tax irregularities is de jure segregation, the
product of some state action (or inaction). The defense contended that
the referendum which decides the amount of tax dollars to be spent on
education is clearly not an action by the state, but by its citizens.' 6
Secondly, McInnis, Serrano and Rodriguez, all rest on the premise
that a quality education is a direct function of the amount of dollars
12. McInnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327 (N.D. Ill. 1968), aff d sub nom., McInnis v. Ogilvie,
394 U.S. 322 (1969).
13. 394 U.S. 322 (1969). Mr. Justice Douglas was of the opinion that probable jurisdiction
should be noted and that the case should be argued.
14. 10 Cal. App., 3d at 1116, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 349.
15. Coons, Clune, and Sugarman, Educational Opportunity!A Workable ConstitutionalTest
for State Financing Structures, 57 CAL L. REV. 305, 308 (1969).
16. Rodriguez v. San Antonio Independent School Dist., 337 F. Supp. 280, 284 (W.D. Tex.
1971). The Supreme Court recently noted the requirement of state action as a factor
necessary to bring the state's practice within the purview of the Equal Protection Clause.
Mere operation of a regulatory scheme by a state or its agencies, without a suggestion
that the state's regulation intended overtly or covertly to encourage discrimination, does
not establish a state action within the Equal Protection Clause. Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 40 U.S.L.W. 4715 (U.S. June 13, 1972).
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spent per student. A Harvard research team recently found that
assumption to be erroneous.
... [N] either the overall level of resources available to a school
nor any specific, easily identifiable school policy has a
significant effect on students' cognitive skills or educational
attainments. Thus, even if we went beyond "equal opportunity" and allocated resources disproportionately to schools
whose students now do worst on tests, and are least likely to
acquire credentials, this would not improve these students'
prospects very much....
... [O]ur research suggests, however, that the character of a
school's output depends largely on a single input, the
characteristics of the entering children.1 7
Accordingly, if the above study is to be believed, this leaves the
plaintiff the insuperable burden of showing that not only was he
damaged (i.e., that he has received an inferior education), but also that
the unequal spending of tax dollars was the proximate cause of that
injury.
The third obstacle facing a decision to affirm Rodriguez is that the
responsibility of school financing would have to be lifted from local
control and given to the states. State take-over of the financing scheme
would strike hard at the philosophy of home rule; but moreover, it is
difficult to envision the state assuming the financial burden of the
school system without exercising excessive control over the school's
operations, curricula, etc.
If the states assume this role, there may be as much of an
infringement of rights of the state's residents as in the present system,
inasmuch as there would then be established fifty degrees of quality
education. Thus, New York, because of its greater wealth, would
theoretically be able to offer its residents better schools than
Georgia.'8 Accordingly, a true system of education open to all on
equal terms (as required by Brown), could only be achieved by direct
federal funding of schools.' '
An unequivocal affirmation of Rodriguez might not be limited
merely to unequal educational spending throughout the state, but
might well require all local governmental services to be of an equal
quality. Thus, police protection, library services, etc., in one
community might have to be equal to the services offered in another
17. Jencks & Bane, The Schools and Equal Opportunity, SATURDAY REV. OF EDUCATION,
Oct. 1972, at 41.
18. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS, GENERAL SOCIAL & ECONOMIC CHARACTERSITICS FINAL
REPORT PC (1)-C34 N.Y. at 311; DEPT. OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS, GENERAL SOCIAL &
ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS FINAL REPORT PC

(1)-C12 Ga. at 257 (1972).

19. For an in-depth study of the accounting procedures necessary to comply with the mandate for equal education, see Coons, supra note 15.
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community, and nearly all fiscal control of local programs by local
governments would be destroyed.

CONCLUSION
While the existence of inequities in the property tax system is
granted, these inequities do not create an infringement of any
constitutional rights, for as the Court has stated:
To be able to find fault with a law is not to demonstrate its
invalidity. It may seem unjust and oppressive, yet be free from
judicial interference. The problems of government are practical
ones... Mere errors of government are not subject to our
judicial review. It is only its palpably arbitrary exercises which
2
can be declared void under the fourteenth amendment. 0
Therefore, the Rodriguez decision disallowing property taxation for
public school financing may well be reversed for three reasons: (1) the
requirement of an invidious discriminatory state action is absent herein,
(2) the burden of proving damage has not been met, as recent studies
question the assumption that equal educational opportunity is a
function of increased spending, and (3) only federal socialized
education would eliminate the present inequalities at the exorbitant
cost of taking control of the schools away from the local parents.
S.H.O.

CRIMINAL LAW-THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE IN MARYLANDWARRANTLESS SEARCH OF PREMISES AND SEIZURE OF
EVIDENCE HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL. BROWN V. STATE, 15
Md. App. 584, 292 A.2d 762 (1972).
In Brown v. State,' officers investigating a series of burglaries
questioned a suspect in the street. The officers requested and were
denied permission to search his residence. The officers then proceeded
to the suspect's residence, a rented room in a house belonging to a Mrs.
Hall, ostensibly for the purpose of obtaining a description of the place
to be used in the search warrant. The investigators identified themselves
and were invited in by Mrs. Hall. From the hallway outside of the
suspect's room, they observed through the already open door a box
containing articles easily identifiable as part of the stolen goods from
the burglaries under investigation. One of the officers reached into the
room, without actually stepping into it, and seized the box.
20. Metropolis Theater Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1913).
1. 15 Md. App. 584, 292 A.2d 762 (1972).

